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FOREWORD
Sanctions are here to stay as an instrument of  US foreign policy. But they remain faintly understood by most policy 
makers, a risk considering how frequently they are utilized. Of  particular concern, many policy makers still view 
sanctions as a panacea and even a victimless form of  warfare. They see the application of  sanctions as an alternative 
to violence rather than an element along its spectrum and even worse, as now being sufficiently targeted and precise 
so as to avoid the risk of  misuse or collateral damage. 
As part of  my research into sanctions more generally, I have sought to explore the upswept corners of  sanctions 
policy, starting with the risk of  sanctions overuse in May 2015 and continuing with consideration of  how previously 
sanctioned jurisdictions can be reconnected to the global community. In this vein, the Center on Global Energy 
Policy has commissioned papers on Myanmar (by Peter Kucik) and Cuba (by Peter Harrell), in addition to my own 
paper on Iran. 
This paper is intended to be another in this broad series of  papers, touching upon the issue of  collateral damage 
from sanctions. Or, put another way, how do sanctions targeting one country affect another, potentially one with 
strategic—if  not global—importance? And, to be more pointed, are sanctions that cause discomfort for one country 
yet potentially even more pain for another in the end worth it—both as a general matter and to the country imposing 
the sanctions? 
Leaving consideration of  the conclusion of  this research to the paper itself, it is worth noting that it is these sorts 
of  questions that this program—looking at economic statecraft, sanctions, and energy markets—will continue to 
address in the months and hopefully years to come.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By definition, sanctions are intended to inflict pain on others. But, ideally constructed, that pain is only felt by the 
target of  the sanctions, which then is inclined to change its policy to something more consistent with the interests 
of  the sanctioner. Yet, notwithstanding many suggestions that modern sanctions have become “smart,” like “smart” 
bombs, they can still miss. Unintended consequences are a well-established phenomenon in the use of  sanctions 
but are usually considered only in the context of  the target. This paper assesses the unintended consequences of  
sanctions on those who are prevented from doing business with a sanctioned entity—in this case Pakistan’s energy 
firms due to sanctions against Iranian natural gas development and investment.
The question that motivated this research is simple: Did US sanctions against Iran, which were first imposed in 1996 
in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and in the comprehensive embargo erected by President Clinton against Iran, 
have a discernable, deleterious impact on Pakistan and if  so, how much and in what form? And were they, simply 
put, worth it? 
This paper finds that Pakistan was harmed by the imposition of  sanctions against Iran, though it requires some 
degree of  counterfactual analysis to divine exactly to what degree and how Pakistan might have developed absent 
US sanctions. I also conclude that the impact of  US sanctions against Iran that implicated Pakistan was marginal but 
that it is impossible to ascertain how much the effectiveness of  the sanctions regime would have been impaired in 
their absence.
Three overarching conclusions and associated recommendations can be identified from the resulting analysis:
1. First, when imposing sanctions, policy makers should ensure that their preparations for action include an 
extensive exploration of  the range of  consequences that may result from those sanctions. Long-term economic 
damage is less often considered, particularly insofar as denial of  new activities and business is concerned, and 
especially with respect to the interests of  those beyond the sanctioned and the sanctioner.
2. Second, policy makers should ensure that when imposing sanctions, they do more to help address the inevitable, 
if  unintended, consequences that will result. Beyond the many good reasons to do so from a perspective of  
fairness and decency, taking such an approach can also strengthen sanctions enforcement on the part of  others.
3. Third, policy makers should be required to conduct a more detailed analysis on the potential consequences of  
sanctions imposition, including through use of  public information and comment periods. 
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INTRODUCTION
By definition, sanctions are intended to inflict pain on others. They are designed to impose real costs to states, 
entities, and individuals for the purpose of  shifting their policies, changing their behaviors, or abandoning illicit or 
illegitimate conduct. Since pain is an essential part of  the endeavor, it is not surprising that sanctions have also been 
found to inflict pain beyond what is necessary or desirable, including against those beyond the immediate target. 
The unintended consequences of  sanctions can cover a range of  ills, from the denial of  humanitarian goods to the 
increased cost of  goods that remain available to the curtailing of  legitimate activity by private companies fearful of  
government retribution. But the prevailing theme is that even tightly designed and well-executed sanctions programs 
can exceed their mandates for the type of  pain applied and its destination.
For good reason, unintended consequences have also been a subject of  intense study, usually by advocacy groups for 
either the targets involved or more general causes, such as the availability of  humanitarian resources for vulnerable 
populations. Less frequently considered are the unintended consequences of  sanctions regimes on entirely separate 
populations or governments. In part, this is because it is difficult to identify or quantify those consequences. 
Unintended consequences are often hard enough to identify—much less prove—because there could be many 
different reasons for something tentatively judged to be an unintended consequence of  sanctions. Iran is a good case 
in point: during the 2006 to 2013 period, sanctions were tight but never touched Iranian access to food as a direct 
matter. The fact that food prices went up due to inflation and currency exchange rates probably had something to 
do with sanctions—and in some cases, even scarcity—but making this link explicitly causal is tough to do. This is 
particularly an issue when a sanctioning party wants to avoid being linked to the unintended consequence in question, 
as I have written about separately.1 
Proving an unintended consequence outside of  the intended target—particularly if  the target in question is a 
country—is an order of  magnitude more difficult and fraught with political significance. Governments are particularly 
disincentivized to make such a link, owing to the Powell dictum of  “you break it, you own it,”2 and this is doubly the 
case if  the damage wrought by sanctions happens to fall especially hard on an ally, a fragile state, or a country that—in 
part because of  the consequence of  sanctions—becomes fragile.
At the same time, just because a problem is hard to identify or politically sensitive does not mean that it does not 
exist. Rather, it underscores the degree to which policy making must be a complex, time-consuming, and thoughtful 
effort if  it is to be done right. Failing to consider carefully the second and third tier consequences of  a state’s actions 
effectively means taking a posture of  willful ignorance, which is neither conducive to a positive outcome from 
the policy in question nor a particularly responsible attitude from the state in question. It is the replacement of  
confidence, certainty, and hope over prudence, analysis, and sobriety.
In this paper, I look at the potential consequences of  US sanctions against Iran on the development of  Pakistan, 
particularly its energy sector. The question that motivated this research is simple: Did US sanctions against Iran, 
which were first imposed in 1996 in the ILSA and in the comprehensive embargo erected by President Clinton 
against Iran, have a discernable, deleterious impact on Pakistan and if  so, how much and in what form? And were 
they, simply put, worth it? In looking into this question, I considered the nature and scale of  US sanctions, the energy 
needs and planning of  Pakistan, the opportunity cost to Pakistan from being denied access to Iranian natural gas, and 
the benefits to the sanctions regime obtained regardless. 
The paper finds that Pakistan was harmed by the imposition of  sanctions against Iran, though it requires some 
degree of  counterfactual analysis to divine exactly to what degree and how Pakistan might have developed absent 
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US sanctions. I also conclude that the impact of  US sanctions against Iran that implicated Pakistan was marginal 
but that it is impossible to ascertain how much the effectiveness of  the sanctions regime would have been impaired 
in their absence. This is because, though we can identify within reasonable ranges the direct, monetary cost of  the 
sanctions against Tehran, it is impossible to ascertain the degree to which Iran’s abnormality and inability to secure 
even a simple, direct natural gas relationship with Pakistan played on the minds of  Iranian leaders, economic decision 
makers, and eventually nuclear negotiators. 
While the paper clearly concludes that Pakistan is a clear example of  a third party state that has been damaged by 
sanctions, it does not assert that sanctions against countries should never be contemplated nor even that sanctions 
against Iran should be avoided regardless of  future circumstance. Rather, I argue that it is worthwhile to expand the 
framework for analysis of  sanctions imposition before action is taken, particularly when sanctions that could have 
unintended regional or global economic consequences are contemplated. More than anything, my suggestion is that 
policy makers ensure that in addition to the Powell rule, they also consider the wisdom of  looking more carefully 
before they leap.
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT ON PAKISTAN FROM U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
8 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
US SANCTIONS ON IRAN AFFECTING PAKISTAN
Many different aspects of  the long-standing US sanctions regime against Iran may have affected Pakistan in one way 
or another. After all, the two countries are neighbors, sharing a 500-mile border as well as common concerns about 
trade, security, natural resources, and regional politics. Even very extreme unintended consequences due to sanctions, 
such as any diminution in Iran’s ability to police the border to prevent smuggling, could have negatively affected 
Pakistan.
However, several factors limit the overall impact of  sanctions against Iran on Pakistan. Importantly, despite their 
shared border, the economic interactions between the two states are limited. Two elements of  the US sanctions 
regime against Iran were and are particularly relevant to Pakistan:
1. Targeted designations of  individuals and entities, and
2. Prohibition on investment in Iran’s oil and natural gas sector.
Targeted Designations
The first category of  sanctions pertain to the administrative decision of  the US executive branch that particular 
people or entities are involved in activities that run contrary to US law. There are a number of  specific activities that 
could result in such a decision, each of  which relate to either executive orders or statutes that have been adopted to 
date. These include engaging in activities that
• support the proliferation of  weapons of  mass destruction and their means of  delivery
• support acts of  terrorism,
• violate human rights, and
• seek to evade US sanctions against already targeted entities and individuals.
Under most US sanctions programs, the international effects of  these designations are somewhat muted. Most banks 
and international businesses use the US Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list to perform 
their necessary due diligence activities, but the SDN list—for non-Americans—is more advisory than compulsory, 
absent any US linkage to the underlying trade or business activity. The Iran sanctions program is different. Under 
the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), particularly as amended by 
later statute, the United States reserves the option to impose sanctions on any individual or entity that engages in 
significant transactions with the designated Iranian target. In other words, the United States creates a risk of  direct 
sanctions against anyone who undertakes substantial business activity with a designated Iranian entity, broadening the 
scope of  US sanctions and their reach.
Over the course of  2006 to 2016, few—if  any—Pakistani entities and individuals were subject to US sanctions due to 
their business activity with Iranians, and none remain sanctioned at this time. Compared to the number of  Pakistanis 
directly sanctioned for activities with little or nothing to do with Iran, this category of  sanctions is not likely to have 
been responsible for much if  anything in the way of  damage to the Pakistani economy.
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This may not be the case with respect to our second category: sanctions targeting investment in Iran’s oil and natural 
gas sector.
Prohibition on Investment
In 1996, President Clinton signed the ILSA into law. ILSA was constructed to deter international oil and gas companies 
from investing in Iran and thereby contributing to its ability to fund and support a variety of  bad acts, including 
terrorism. It followed the imposition of  US sanctions via executive order that created a unilateral, comprehensive 
embargo against Iran. In this, ILSA can be seen as an attempt to level the playing field for US companies vis-à-vis 
Iran, which would otherwise be open for business to third party countries. 
Specifically, the law required the president to impose sanctions on any entity or individual that “with actual knowledge, 
on or after the date of  the enactment of  this Act, made an investment of  $40,000,000  or more (or any combination 
of  investments of  at least $10,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month 
period), that directly and significantly contributed to the enhancement of  Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources 
of  Iran.”3 Petroleum resources were defined elsewhere in the statute as including natural gas, and similarly, the 
statute also defined develop to mean “the exploration for, or the extraction, refining, or transportation by pipeline 
of, petroleum resources.” The statute contained waivers as well as language that would permit some degree of  
definitional flexibility on the part of  the executive branch. That said, it was designed as a way of  clamping down on 
significant support to Iran’s oil and gas sector.
Various foreign governments, especially in Europe, immediately opposed ILSA; they were in part emboldened by 
similar US sanctions adopted earlier in 1996 with respect to Cuba. The French company Total served as the most 
direct flash point when it agreed to help develop the South Pars gas field in 1997 along with Petronas and Gazprom. 
When the United States began the investigation of  Total, pursuant to ILSA, it precipitated a confrontation with 
Europe in which the European Union (EU) both passed legislation that forbade European companies from adhering 
to US law if  contrary to EU law and began a suit at the World Trade Organization (WTO), claiming the US legislation 
was inconsistent with WTO commitments. The result was a climb down by both parties, in which the United States 
waived the sanctions that could be imposed on Total, Petronas, and Gazprom and decided not to pursue further such 
investigations provided that the United States and the European Union worked to prevent Iranian acts of  terrorism 
and proliferation.4, 5 
But notwithstanding the decision to walk back aggressive sanctions enforcement under ILSA in Europe, the United 
States kept up the pressure on companies around the world to not engage in new business ventures with Iran. This 
included Asian companies similarly interested in oil and natural gas production in Iran, as well as those seeking to 
develop new natural gas pipelines using Iranian gas as the source. The most prominent project that could have been 
affected was the Shah Deniz gas pipeline, which was intended to bring gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe (and 
provide an alternative source of  gas to Russian supply). However, out of  recognition of  the geopolitical concerns 
attached to this issue, the United States declined to press home its potential prohibition on such activities, essentially 
grandfathering phase 1 of  the project and waiving phase 2 from sanctions, even those which followed ILSA and 
strengthened it in time.6, 7 The United States’ interpretation of  ILSA as pertains to pipelines was also in flux during 
this time, as various countries (Turkey foremost among them) sought to differentiate between pipeline construction 
and investment, suggesting a distinction that was debatable to say the least given the real focus of  the legislation was 
impeding Iran’s ability to export more of  its hydrocarbon resources.8
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Proposed Iran-Pakistan Pipeline Project
Source: The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-build-pipeline-from-iran-to-pakistan-1428515277.
The other pipeline of  principal interest involved Pakistan and—at least for a time—India. Iranian natural gas was 
intended to play a substantial role in Pakistan’s future as of  the mid-1990s. In fact, Pakistan arguably banked on 
Iranian gas and suffered consequences after it didn’t materialize.
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PAKISTANI ENERGY NEEDS AND PLANNING
Like many other emerging markets, Pakistan’s energy needs have intensified over time as development and popular 
expectations drove the Pakistani government and its utilities to identify the means of  delivering power around the 
country. 
Between 1971 and 1990, Pakistan’s energy consumption went from 93.5 kilowatt hours (kWh) per person to 277.5 
kWh, an almost 200 percent increase in approximately 30 years.9 Yet, by the 1990s, Pakistan’s population was still 
underserved with respect to electricity consumption. In 1990, 59.6 percent of  Pakistan’s population had access 
to electricity, according to the World Bank (official Pakistani numbers were lower).10 Most of  those people were 
unsurprisingly located in urban areas, as only 44.7 percent of  the rural Pakistani population had access to electricity 
in the same year.11 The Pakistani government understood that to take the next step in the country’s development, it 
needed to increase the population’s access to electricity. 
Pakistani Plans
Pakistan’s plan was focused on bringing the private sector into power development, creating “incentives…devised 
in order to attract foreign and domestic entrepreneurs.”12 The Pakistani government assessed that the core problem 
was “a high degree of  suppressed demand” caused by the absence of  sufficient production capacity.13 The Pakistani 
government was not terribly concerned with the source of  fuel for its desired capacity expansion, noting in its official 
policy statement from 1994 that “investors are free to propose the site and opt for the technology and fuel, including 
residual furnace oil, diesel oil, natural gas, LPG etc. for the project, depending on the availability of  fuel, cooling 
water, infrastructure, environmental impacts and economics of  the tariff.”14 
In the end, Pakistan chose to concentrate on quick progress by relying on fuel oil, and “of  the additional generation 
capacity installed between 1994 and 2004, more than two-thirds required fuel oil to function.”15 In the late 1990s and 
early part of  the 2000s, this was not an unreasonable decision. It was, however, shortsighted and premised on the 
low oil prices of  the period. With the “sharp increase in oil prices in the 2000s” came “skyrocketing costs of  power 
generation” and inevitable damage to Pakistani industry and development.16 Additionally, the rigid and inefficient 
structure of  the power sector with misaligned incentives could not adjust. This led to power generation cuts and 
reduced investment into future generation capacity. 
Pakistan also pursued natural gas as means of  satisfying the country’s energy needs due to its domestic reserves 
and extensive natural gas distribution network. Pakistan is believed to have significant natural gas reserves,17 and 
in the 1990s through the 2000s, Pakistan sought foreign participation in extraction and production arrangements. 
Notwithstanding these efforts as well as the 1994 policy statement and incentive packages, exploration and production 
of  those reserves lagged because the prices offered to foreign companies simply were insufficient inducement.18 
Foreign imports were a potential way for Pakistan to bridge the gap between domestic demand and supply, providing 
energy needed for both industrial and public consumption. 
Pakistan therefore considered imports from two sources: Turkmenistan to the north and Iran to the west. The 
pipeline that would originate in Turkmenistan would have gone through Afghanistan and terminated in India (it 
was called the TAPI pipeline as a result). But, even in 2017, progress on TAPI has been slow and halting due to the 
complexities of  constructing a pipeline through war-torn Afghanistan and other economic, security, and political 
issues among the players.19 
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Conflicting reports suggest that the Iran-focused project began as early as 1993,20 while others point to a memorandum 
of  understanding signed by the two governments in 1995 as the starting point.21 Regardless, by the mid- to late 1990s, 
there were frequent discussions being held bilaterally by Iran with Pakistan and with India about the construction of  
a pipeline—at one point, dubbed the “Peace Pipeline” by politicians eager to suggest it could serve as a confidence 
building measure between the countries—to bring natural gas from Iran through Pakistan and into India. 
The U.S. imposition of  sanctions on Iranian natural gas supplies came at an important time for this process. The 
United States spent the bulk of  the 1990s and 2000s warning India and Pakistan away from constructing the pipeline 
and more generally from doing business with the Iranians (an effort I was part of  starting in approximately 2007). 
The pipeline also ran into trouble due to rising tensions between India and Pakistan, both of  which tested nuclear 
weapons in 1998 and seemed on the brink of  war at multiple points over the next 4 to 5 years. Bilateral discussions 
continued between the parties but were adversely affected by this regional drama,22 and the project was delayed. 
Eventually, India dropped out because of  lingering concerns over Pakistan’s ability to interrupt supplies to India in a 
crisis;23 US political pressure at the time (when the United States and India were negotiating a deal on how the world 
might treat India’s nuclear weapons program);24 and perhaps pricing.
Pakistan and Iran continued their conversation and planning for the construction of  the pipeline and Pakistani import 
of  Iranian natural gas. In 2005, Pakistan and Iran signed a memorandum of  understanding that established a timeline 
for the construction of  the pipeline and deliveries of  natural gas, which were to start in 2012 to 2013.25 Construction 
on the Iranian side of  the border proceeded apace, with Iran completing its portion of  the pipeline by July 2011.26 
But, as of  the time of  this writing, the pipeline has not been completed nor obviously has any natural gas been 
transmitted by it. Instead, Pakistan ran into funding shortfalls that delayed its ability to complete construction on its 
side of  the border.27 (It is also worth noting that, as Pakistan’s energy and gas needs specifically have mounted, Pakistan 
has also turned to the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market for significant volumes of  gas.28) Certainly, Pakistan’s own 
economic issues played a role in the delay. But so too did the imposition of  sanctions that made it more difficult for 
Pakistan to obtain foreign investment in support of  the pipeline.29 In fact, the Pakistani government itself  displayed at 
times a willingness to ignore US arguments against the pipeline, particularly in the context of  US-Pakistani tensions, 
deteriorating relations over the activities of  militants operating in Pakistan, and US operations to eliminate them.30 
But notwithstanding this public commitment to the pipeline, progress on the Pakistani side was moribund for years. 
 
Assessment of  Impact on Pakistan
The question becomes whether Pakistan suffered—and to what degree—when it could not secure natural gas from Iran. 
The case is arguably mixed and inherently counterfactual. Even assuming the Iran-Pakistan pipeline had not been 
hindered through US sanctions pressure, it would have been a multiyear project, and Iranian-Pakistani projections 
did not anticipate gas flowing before 2013.31, 32, 33 Consequently, though Pakistan’s energy shortages prior to 2012 and 
2013 are important factors to consider in the context of  its overall development, they are not especially relevant to 
my assessment of  sanctions impact. 
Even with the pre-2013 period excluded, there is still compelling evidence to suggest that Pakistan was adversely 
affected by the inability to take Iranian natural gas from 2013 to 2016 and consequently, US sanctions pressure.
During this period, Pakistan suffered an acute natural gas shortage. Figure 1 demonstrates that the gap in Pakistani 
supply and demand could have been substantially filled by imports from Iran had they been available. Absent those 
imports, Pakistan lacked reasonable options to fill that gap using natural gas.34 
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Figure 1: Pakistan Natural Gas Market, 1990–2017
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Pakistan’s emphasis on fuel oil, so destructive to investment in alternative sources of  energy in the 1990s and Pakistani 
finances in the 2000s, was at least somewhat beneficial to the country when oil prices collapsed in 2014. But, as 
Rashid Aziz and Munawar Baseer Ahmad noted in their 2015 report, “multiple factors, compounded across multiple 
governments, have contributed to Pakistan’s current energy crisis.”35 They note the following:
• Physical shortage, with supply not increasing along with demand
• Financial shortfall, with an inability on the part of  utilities to cover the cost of  supply
• Broad governance crisis, with the government “unable to impose commercial discipline, particularly on government-
owned utilities and institutions.”36 This includes issues of  electricity theft and some entities not paying their bills.
The Aziz-Ahmad report goes on to explore the many different interrelationships that exist between these three factors 
and the deficiencies in government policy and legislation that led to their eventual metastasizing into the crisis from 
which Pakistan is now seeking to extricate itself. As their report makes clear (and Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) 
own analysis of  Pakistan underscores), solutions to all three challenges were and are necessary for Pakistan to make 
progress in arresting its energy problem. But the supply problem was a crucial, central variable among them.
Assessment of  Broader Impact on Macroeconomic and Political Issues in Pakistan 
Pakistan’s poor energy situation over the past 20 years has directly contributed to its macroeconomic weakness and 
potentially its political and social instability. 
As the ADB reported in its annual development outlook, “continued energy shortages” are a reason why Pakistan has 
not met annual government growth targets given the drag effect they have on large-scale manufacturing, in particular.37 
The situation has improved since 2013, when the ADB assessed that prolonged power shortages cut GDP by 2 to 3 
percent in 201338 and that ongoing reforms have shown progress, but the ADB judges both that the price of  oil will 
remain a wild card for Pakistan and that further improvements are necessary.39 The ADB underscored that the power 
deficit is the “greatest impediment to manufacturing and growth.”40 
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Figure 2: Pakistan’s Human Development Index Score, 1980–2014













These problems exacerbated the overall poor state of  the Pakistani economy. Pakistan’s economy remains one of  the 
world’s largest, ranked 41st in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015.41 But GDP per capita has not kept up with 
Pakistan, consistently ranking in the bottom tier of  states. Pakistan ranks 147th in the UN Development Programme’s 
Human Development Index, below Nepal and above Myanmar, and its development index score has stagnated since 
the 1980s (figure 2). This is particularly notable in contrast with India, which started in more or less the same place in 
1980, and across South Asia in general. 
Pakistan has also suffered a variety of  political and social upsets at least in part as a result of  its poor economic 
growth. It is well established that political instability undermines economic growth.42 But it is also true that weak 
economic growth—particularly when tied to questions of  fairness, income inequality, and the appropriate distribution 
of  resources—can contribute to instability. This seems like an appropriate description of  some of  the problems 
Pakistan has had in the past decades, typified by multiple changes of  government—including through military coups 
and as a result of  violent demonstrations—over the past 50 years. Pakistan’s economic difficulties have been tied 
in studies to the increased prevalence of  terrorism,43 and allegations of  corruption have coincided with many of  
Pakistan’s more turbulent political episodes.44 
 
Certainly, not all of  Pakistan’s internal difficulties stem from energy much less the inability of  the country to access 
Iranian natural gas. There are many different reasons why Pakistan has labored through multiple coups, assassinations, 
and violent demonstrations over the past two decades. Iranian supply would not have come online prior to 2013. 
Moreover, as discussed, there are various reasons why Pakistan has been incapable of  sustaining its energy needs, let 
alone the many factors that contribute to economic performance and political upheaval. Some of  these factors are 
themselves an element of  Pakistan’s inability to develop energy resources: without the internal turmoil seen in the 
country over the past 10 years, Pakistan may have been able to develop alternative sources of  energy production, 
potentially through its domestic resources. But the lack of  Iranian supply was potentially a contributing factor, 
particularly in the last 3 years. 
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ASSESSMENT OF BENEFIT FROM SPECIFIED SANCTIONS 
ON IRAN POLICY
Even if  one assumes that the damage wrought on Pakistan was severe, it may be justified from a US perspective if  it 
prevented the greater harm to international stability and security that would have resulted from Iranian acquisition 
of  nuclear weapons. If  we assume that US sanctions were an instrumental part of  Iran’s decision to come to the 
negotiating table, then one might conclude it is reasonable to believe that sanctions against Iranian natural gas 
development were also an important constituent element of  this endeavor.
However, this merits more scrutiny, as there were a range of  US—not to mention UN Security Council (UNSC) 
and EU—sanctions brought to bear against Iran. The question naturally arises: Out of  the overall mix of  sanctions 
applied against Iran, how significant was the prohibition on natural gas investment? 
Two levels of  analysis are appropriate to consider here:
1. The loss of  hard currency revenue for Iran resulting from Pakistan’s inability to complete the project and to buy 
the gas.
2. The systemic impact on sanctions enforcement resulting from a tough stance on Pakistan.
Lost Revenue
The most straightforward damage Iran faced from the absence of  a Pakistani pipeline is the lost revenue from those 
potential natural gas sales. As noted previously, making calculations with respect to lost revenue is complicated, not 
least because critical variables, including price, could have shifted with the inclusion of  new Iranian supply on the 
market. But, even acknowledging the complexity of  making such assumptions, there is enough information about 
Iranian-Pakistani negotiations around their supply arrangement to give a credible ballpark for the opportunity cost 
to Iran from pipeline-related sanctions.
1. First, the Iranians and Pakistanis had come to a general agreement on the overall supply that would be provided 
by Iran. As noted previously, supply was to begin in 2013 and over 5 years would reach approximately 7.75 billion 
cubic meters (bcm) annually.45, 46, 47
2. Second, the Iranians and Pakistanis were also in general agreement on the price of  the gas, though there is some 
ambiguity as to the exact figure. Natural gas pricing in large parts of  Asia is indexed to crude oil prices,48 and 
reports suggest that Iran and Pakistan intended to continue with this practice. Writing for the Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, Ieda Gomez noted in 2013 that “the price formula has been re-negotiated several times, and 
apparently stands at 13.4% Brent/JCC. Pakistan is asking to renegotiate the price to 12% Brent, in line with the 
price apparently agreed for the TAPI pipeline.”49 Other reports indicate that the Iranians and Pakistanis were 
also considering a price as low as 11 percent of  Brent 50 and as high as 14 percent of  Brent.51 Using an average 
of  all of  these numbers and acknowledging that this is a gray area, we can assume a 12 percent Brent figure for 
purposes of  illustrating a ballpark impact on revenues.
Taken in combination, the picture formed is one of  increasingly valuable revenues for Iran but not necessarily a 
revolutionary revenue stream.
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Figure 3 shows that over the course of  5 years, Iran would receive less than $2 billion annually from Pakistan for its 
natural gas exports.
Cumulative revenues also suggest a fairly modest impact in terms of  Iranian receipts during this period of  time, with 
less than $6 billion in revenue in aggregate.
Figure 3: Volumes and revenues for Iran from IP Pipeline
Figure 4: Cumulative and annual revenues for Iran from IP Pipeline
Source: author calculations, using average annual Brent crude oil price and assessed steady increase in natural gas export over 5 year 
period to contractually agreed amount. 
Source: Author’s calculations, using average annual Brent crude oil price and assessed steady increase in natural gas export over 5-year 
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The picture appears even more stark when these revenues are considered in comparison to Iranian exports of  crude oil. 
In 2011, Iran was earning approximately $7.2 billion per month in crude oil sales (assuming an average of  2.4 million 
barrels per day (mbpd) and $100 per barrel). Even when subject to heavy US sanctions in 2013, Iran was earning 
approximately $3 billion per month in crude oil sales (assuming an average of  1 mbpd and $100 per barrel). In this 
context, curtailing the export of  natural gas to Pakistan by clamping down on the construction of  the pipeline may 
have been essential in limiting Iran’s ability to earn those associated revenues. But it paled in comparison to crude oil 
sanctions’ overall impact on revenue terms alone.
That said, the scale of  the annual revenues is only one part of  the story. The United States and its sanctioners had no 
way of  knowing in 1996, 2005, or even 2013 when negotiations would start in earnest. Over the years, the cumulative 
value of  the exports could have been much higher as, linked to Brent, oil prices would have suggested a far greater 
revenue stream in 2011 than 2016. Additionally, by taking a hard line on the Pakistani pipeline, other pipelines—with 
their own respective revenue streams—were probably also affected. Moreover, it is vital to remember the United States’ 
imperative at the time was to prevent Iran from earning any hard currency that could insulate itself  from the effects 
of  the pressure campaign and thereby resist the need to come to the negotiating table. Regardless of  one’s view of  the 
efficacy of  that endeavor (and of  the instrumental nature of  sanctions for the negotiations), it is reasonable to conclude 
that exports totaling more than a $1 billion annually were a worthwhile target for sanctions. In fact, this fits with the 
overall US approach at the time, which targeted not only crude oil but also petrochemical exports (valued at $10 billion 
in 2011, when initial sanctions were applied) and automotive exports (valued at only $500 million in 2013, when initial 
sanctions were applied). Targeting a $2 billion market was not only consistent with this overall approach, but failing to 
do so would have suggested a dangerous inconsistency in US sanctions policy and treatment of  individual states. 
Systemic Impact on Enforcement
The inability to make money from the sale of  new natural gas limited Iran’s revenues. But, by taking a firm stance on 
this issue and enforcement across the board, sanctions against Iran may have been significantly strengthened beyond the 
specific issue of  the pipeline prohibition for three reasons:
1. Targeting new natural gas exports helped to create an increasingly severe de facto blockade on Iranian exports. 
Natural gas was and is a potentially major source of  wealth for the Iranian government, particularly given that 
Iran has among the largest reserves of  gas in the world.52 For this reason, it was repeatedly investigated as a 
potential target for sanctions, along with all other major export industries being developed in the country. During 
the 2010 to 2013 period, the United States took aim at crude oil but also at automobiles through sanctions 
enacted by Congress and the Obama administration. Other industries were also considered for sanctions, and had 
negotiations toward a long-term settlement not commenced in 2013, it is possible that other export industries—
cement, for example—could have been the subject of  sanctions. Without new natural gas exports as part of  the 
existing regime, it would have been difficult to sell the necessity of  targeting less important industries.
2. This targeting also facilitated US executive branch communications with the US Congress about legislative 
proposals that might have damaged the effort. Congress was willing in 2010 to 2013 to consider nearly any 
possible source of  sanctions leverage. Natural gas, as a potentially prominent export with alternative suppliers, 
fell within the target set. However, existing Iranian natural gas supply arrangements with Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
and Turkey were excluded from consideration because the damage that would be done to these states (and US 
interests with respect to preventing Russia from dominating their supply) if  all natural gas exports were targeted. 
Gas was already flowing, and targeting it would have created a major supply problem for these countries that 
may have been difficult to fill, particularly on short notice. With the exception of  LNG, which has its own 
complications, natural gas is more difficult to transport, and consequently, replacement is more cumbersome than 
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with crude oil. On more than one occasion, the executive branch was able to convince members of  Congress—
even those deeply skeptical of  the Obama administration—that US interests were best served by focusing on 
new natural gas exports rather than existing arrangements. This might not have been possible were it not for 
sanctions covering pipelines like that being pursued by Pakistan. Moreover, if  the United States had targeted 
those other arrangements, it may have been difficult to secure crude oil reductions, particularly from Turkey, with 
net damage to US sanctions efforts.
3. By focusing on a US partner and taking a tough approach, the United States signaled to other states that there 
would be no preferential treatment on sanctions enforcement. Though the United States and Pakistan were 
no longer as close as partners by 2011 as in the past, the broader international community still recognized that 
this relationship was important to both sides. The U.S. readiness to consider sanctions against Pakistan—along 
with periodic designations of  individuals and entities located in Europe, the UAE, Israel and other partner 
jurisdictions—may have contributed to the overall sense that no country was immune to US sanctions targeting 
and thereby to willingness to cooperate with US sanctions efforts more generally. 
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A troubling, if  mixed, picture results from the analysis. It is reasonably well established that Pakistan’s energy sector 
has been a source of  considerable economic difficulty for the country. Pakistan’s weak economy has been a factor in 
the country’s internal political turmoil, creating a vicious circle of  damage to its development and stability. And as a 
result, Pakistan has also become a potential source of  international terrorist threats and violence around the world.
The central question of  this paper is to what degree US sanctions against Iran exacerbated these problems for 
Pakistan. It is reasonable to argue that even if  US sanctions did not create Pakistan’s energy crisis (nor would the 
removal of  those sanctions have solved Pakistan’s energy supply gap or indeed the larger problems of  electrical 
generation and distribution that exist), these sanctions certainly did not make it easier for Pakistan to resolve the 
crisis. 
At the same time, it is unclear that the threat of  US sanctions on Iran’s pipeline to Pakistan played a material role 
in solving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Certainly, it is also reasonable to argue that though the sanctions may not have 
led Iran to seek a diplomatic solution in their own right and that other sanctions had greater impact on the Iranian 
economy, the threat of  pipeline-related sanctions were part of  the incremental and all-encompassing sanctions picture 
that undermined Iranian confidence in resistance as a means of  securing economic growth. It is also reasonable to 
argue that if  pipeline sanctions did not create the diplomatic opportunity seized upon in 2013, they may have helped 
and thereby prevented an even worse geopolitical crisis from emerging on Pakistan’s western border. In fact, given 
the hypothetical nature of  the exercise, it is even reasonable to conjecture that had pipeline sanctions not existed 
and that diplomatic success not been achieved, military conflict would eventually have resulted between the United 
States and Iran, disrupting natural gas supplies regardless. This is the inherent problem in undertaking a hypothetical, 
counterfactual assessment.
But taking aside the questions and imprecision that still remains, three overarching conclusions and associated 
recommendations can be identified from the preceding analysis.
1. First, when imposing sanctions, policy makers should ensure that their preparations for action include an extensive 
exploration of  the range of  consequences that may result from those sanctions. From personal experience, I can 
attest that some such analysis takes place but usually from the frame of  immediate humanitarian damage. Long-
term economic damage is less often considered, particularly insofar as denial of  new activities and business is 
concerned. Sanctioners tend to soft-pedal risk and damage analysis of  activities that have yet to be begun, in part 
because there is an implicit assumption that those involved are already doing without whatever good or service is 
in question and can do so in the future. This is a flawed assumption, and it should be changed in favor of  a more 
holistic, open-ended consideration of  consequence in all its dimensions—political, economic, and social.
2. Second, policy makers should ensure that when imposing sanctions, they do more to help address the inevitable, 
if  unintended, consequences that will result. It is not apparent that the early years of  US implementation of  
ILSA and ISA also involved detailed discussions with Pakistan about how to replace the lost opportunity of  
Iranian natural gas. Certainly, there were discussions with Pakistan about how it might resolve its energy shortfall, 
including consideration of  TAPI and other sources of  electricity. But prior to the creation of  the Energy and 
Natural Resources (ENR) Bureau at the State Department in 2011, the picture of  US involvement in foreign 
energy development is cloudy. ENR has many missions, but one of  these is addressing the problems of  energy 
distribution as a potentially serious element of  foreign policy and national security. This is a vital development 
and one that should aid US sanctions personnel in the future in designing and mitigating the consequences of  
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their actions. But outside of  the energy sector, it is less apparent that US sanctions imposition involves much 
discussion with affected third parties about how to address the problems that they will then encounter (and, in 
my experience, that was rarely a focus of  US internal discussions). This can and should change in the future, if  
for no other reason than to strengthen adherence to and cooperation with US sanctions policy.
3. Third, as noted previously,53 policy makers should be required to conduct a more detailed analysis on the potential 
consequences of  sanctions imposition, including thorough use of  public information and comment periods. No 
government has the capacity to look around every corner and identify every potential flaw in an approach. For 
this reason, regulators have enlisted public commentary periods to ensure that there is reasoned debate around 
potential courses of  actions. Certainly, this cannot take place in all circumstances or in addressing every problem; 
one cannot ask the public if  a particular terrorist group ought to have its assets frozen. It is certainly possible 
that this process would not have addressed the problem that Pakistan faced, particularly when the timeline of  20 
years of  sanctions imposition is considered. But for state-level sanctions where there is a long, often legislatively 
determined debate and consideration schedule, there ought to be a companion process of  public dialogue with 
decision makers to ensure that—at a minimum—issues are given a fair hearing. 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT ON PAKISTAN FROM U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
energypolicy.columbia.edu | AUGUST 2017 |  21
NOTES
1 Richard Nephew, “The Humanitarian Impact of  Sanctions,” Center on Global Energy Policies, April 29, 2015. 
2 David Samuels, “A Conversation with Colin Powell,” The Atlantic, April 2007.
 
3 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of  1996, HR 3107, 104th Congress, Second Session, Congressional Record 142, pt. 91, 6469–6471. 
4 Thomas W. Lippman, “US Defers Sanctions on Iran Gas Deal,” The Washington Post, October 4, 1997.
5 “US Waivers ILSA Sanctions on European Companies—But What about US Firms?” Middle East Energy News, Analysis and 
Supporting Data, May 25, 1998.
6 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service, US Library of  Congress, RS20871, 2017.
7 Benoit Faucon, Alessandro Torello, and Alexis Flynn, “Iran Sanction Bill Exempts BP Project,” The Wall Street Journal, January 
23, 2012. 
8 Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al, “Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
June 2012. 
9 World Bank. World Development Indicators Database.
10 World Bank. World Development Indicators Database.
11 World Bank. World Development Indicators Database.




15 Rashid Aziz and Munawar Baseer Ahmad, “Pakistan’s Power Crisis The War Forward,” United States Institute of  Peace, June 
2015. 
16 Ibid.
17 Spencer, Richard, “How Can Pakistan Increase the Availability of  Natural Gas?” World Economic Forum, May 21, 2015.
18 Ibid
19 Vaid Manish and Kan Sanjay, “TAPI Pipeline Progresses But Future Uncertain,” Oil and Gas Journal 114, no. 5 (2016): 88. 
20 “Iran Aims High with 2011 Target to Pump Gas to India,” Business Standard, June 30, 2007. 
21 Micha’el Tanchum, “Modi and the Sino-Indian Game for Iranian Gas,” The Diplomat, July 15, 2015. 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT ON PAKISTAN FROM U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
22 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
22 Sadika Hameed and Kathy Gisinan,“Amid Obstacles, First Steps toward Improved Cooperation between India and Pakistan,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 14, 2012. 
23 Zeeshan Haider, “Pakistan, Iran Sign Deal on Natural Gas Pipeline,” Reuters, March 17, 2010. 
24 “New Delhi Calls for IPI Talks,” UPI, March 19, 2010. 
25 Syed Hassan Nawab, “Pakistan’s Gas Import Pipeline Projects,” presentation by, the Energy Charter Treaty Meeting on Transit 
and Trade, Brussels, October 26–27, 2006. 
26 Tom Hussain, “Energy-Poor Pakistan Makes Gas Pipelines a Priority,” The National, July 11, 2011. 
27 Ankit Panda, “Will the Iran Deal Help the Iran-Pakistan Pipeline Project?” The Diplomat, July 28, 2015. 
28 Mark Tay, “Pakistan Prepares Its Second LNG Import Terminal,” Reuters, August 23, 2016.
 
29 Zafar Bhutta, “Investors Unwilling to Finance IP Pipeline: Abbasi,” Tribune, May 24, 2016.
 
30 Meir Javedanfar, “Has Obama Pushed Pakistan Towards Iran?” The Atlantic, July 14, 2011. 
31 “Inter State Gas Systems.” 
32 Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Preapres to Proceed with Iran Pipeline Project,” Financial Times, July 19, 2015, https://www.ft.com/
content/1863c570-2de9-11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d.
33 Danila Bochkarev, “Transit and Regional Energy Governance in Central and South Asia,” (presentation, the international 
Meeting of  Experts on Reliabel and Stable Transit of  Energy for Sustainable Development in Ashgabat, December 10–11, 
2014), http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Events/IME_Ashgabat_2014_S2_Bochkarev.pdf.
34 Abache Abreu, “Feature: Pakistan Seeks to End Gas Shortage with LNG Imports,” Platts, February 23, 2017. 
35 Aziz and Ahmad, “Pakistan’s Power Crisis The War Forward.”
36 Ibid.
37 “Asian Development Outlook 2016 Asia’s Potential Growth,” Asian Development Bank, 2016. 
38 US Energy Information Administration, Pakistan Analysis, August 2016. 
39 “Asian Development Outlook 2016 Asia’s Potential Growth,” Asian Development Bank, 2016. 
40 Ibid.
41 World Bank. World Development Indicator Database, April 28, 2017. 
42 Ari Aisen, and Francisco Jose Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?” International Monetary Fund, 
January 2011. 
43 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Metric of  Terrorism and Instability in Pakistan” (presented at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, December 18, 2014). 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT ON PAKISTAN FROM U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN
energypolicy.columbia.edu | AUGUST 2017 |  23
44 “Pakistan—Politics,” Global Security, last modified January 11, 2016. 
45 “Interstate Gas Systems” 
46 Bokahari, “Pakistan Prepares to Proceed with Iran Piplenine Project.”
47 Bochkarev, “Transit and Regional Energy.” 
48 US Energy Information Administration. “Natural Gas Prices in Asia Mainly Linked to Crude Oil, But Use of  Spot Indexed 
Increases,” September 29, 2015. 
49 Leda Gomes, “Natural Gas in Pakistan and Bangladesh: Current Issues and Trends,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 
2013. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/NG-77.pdf.
50 Bochkarev, “Transit and Regional Energy.” 
51 Khaleeq Kiani, “Favourable LNG Price Secured from Qatar, Claims Govt,” Dawn, February 11, 2016. https://www.dawn.
com/news/123878 
52 Bijan Khajehpour, “The Future of  the Petroleum Sector in Iran,” Legatum Institute Future of  Iran Series, September 2013. 
53 Nephew. “Issue Brief: The Future of  Economic Sanctions in a Global Economy.” 
The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The first barrels of crude 
shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into tankers 
in May 2014. Threats of legal action by Iraq’s central 
government have reportedly held back buyers to take 
delivery of the cargoes so far. The pipeline can currently 
operate at a capacity of 300,000 b/d, but the Kurdish 
government plans to eventually ramp-up its capacity to 1 
million b/d, as Kurdish oil production increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

